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1. Introduction
One effect of the leaks by former National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 was
that both Apple and Google introduced encryption to
their smartphones. Law enforcement and intelligence
agencies protested that widespread, unbreakable en-
cryption would make it harder to retrieve evidence from
these phones in criminal investigations (Kehl, Wilson, &
Bankston, 2015, p. 1). In early 2016, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) issued a court order to compel Ap-
ple to unlock an encrypted iPhone 5C that was used by
the San Bernardino attacker in December 2015. The FBI
wanted Apple to rewrite its iOS software, to disable en-
cryption security features that would allow the enforce-
ment agency to guess the correct passcodes in a trial and
error fashion. Apple resisted and ignited a wider debate
within the context of the presidential elections. For some
observers, the Apple/FBI debate resembled another in-
stance of the so-called crypto-wars, defined as techno-
logical debates about whether the government should
have access to encrypted communication. The crypto-
wars between national security actors, technology firms
and Internet users emerged during the early days of the
World Wide Web in late 1992 with the debate about the
Clipper chip (Kehl et al., 2015). The aim of this contri-
bution is to analyze whether these two crypto-war dis-
courses are in fact similar. Are there any lessons that can
be drawn for the current debate?
This paper builds broadly on the Copenhagen School
(Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1997) in International Rela-
tions and the concept of securitization of technology
(Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012; Deibert & Rohozin-
ski, 2010; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009), which provides
a link to Science and Technology Studies. Securitiza-
tion is understood as the social construction of secu-
rity/insecurity, for example in the digital realm (cyber se-
curity). Actors compete in the discourse over the mean-
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ing of security, i.e. what counts as a threat and how
these threats should be dealt with (Dunn Cavelty, 2013).
Threat constructions are used for the legitimization of
extraordinary security measures that would not be ap-
proved by a democratic audience in the absence of a
threat. These measures include electronic surveillance,
Internet censorship (Deibert, 2015), offensive computer-
network-attack capabilities (Lawson, 2012) and excep-
tional access or state-regulation of encrypted communi-
cation, called crypto-politics (Moore & Rid, 2016).
Interestingly, the securitization framework has been
rarely adopted to study cryptography discourses. Stud-
ies on the crypto-wars debate tend to be either techni-
cal (see Abelson et al., 2015; Dam & Lin, 1996) or histor-
ical (Kehl et al., 2015). Empirical securitization studies,
which focus on digital technologies, tend to ignore the
potential material impact of discourses, as Dunn Cavelty
argues (Dunn Cavelty, 2015). The securitization of cryp-
tography could have severe implications for cyber secu-
rity but also for human rights in the digital age. Govern-
mental access to otherwise secure cryptography could,
in the worst case, substantially weaken these systems
and thus threaten the safety of digital technologies like
smartphones, which billions of people use.
The next section offers a short introduction to cryp-
tography debates and outlines the two cases. These are
then compared in a qualitative fashion, focusing on what
the dominant arguments and actors are. I will concen-
trate on similarities first and then discuss the differences
between the discourses. The final section offers a critical
discussion of the arguments.
2. A Short History of the Crypto-Wars
Encryption is a century-old technique to scramble read-
able text, via mathematical algorithms, into unreadable
cypher-text. Sender and recipient require a correct key
or password to make the encrypted text intelligible again.
The purpose of encryption is to avoid eavesdropping
from third parties. Since 1976, a method called public-
key encryption (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) promised easy-
to-use, widespread encryption of electronic communi-
cation. The NSA recognized the potential danger to its
global signals intelligence (interception of communica-
tion data) effort, if encrypted communication became
a mainstream technology. Director of the NSA, Bobby
Inman, warned that “unrestrained public discussion of
cryptologic matters will seriously damage the ability of
this government to conduct signals intelligence” (Inman,
1979, p. 130). Coinciding with the beginning of the per-
sonal computer revolution, the NSA argued that an im-
portant data source would be “going dark” if every new
PC user were to use encrypted, digital communications.
Thus, the entire sphere of digital communication could be
metaphorically shrouded in darkness, unreadable to the
NSA. The dilemma of how to resolve this issue was born.
In 1992, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
began with the development of a consumer-market tele-
phone that could encrypt voice communication between
two parties. The NSA recognized that with the looming
digital age, traditional, interceptable audio communica-
tion could be replaced by encrypted digital communica-
tion (Kaplan, 2016, p. 21). This led NSA Director Michael
McConnell to rush into the development of the Clipper
technology, which would set a standard for the emerging
market. The proposal theoretically allowed user-friendly
encryption based on a hardware chip called Clipper,
which would be attached to devices like phones or com-
puters. In contrast to other products on the market, it
had a built-in security weakness: a copy of the encryp-
tion key would be stored in government databases. This
key-escrow method gave law enforcement “exceptional
access” to an otherwise secure technology. The NSA and
FBI could thus eavesdropon anyClipper-basedphone call
with a warrant because they could access a copy of the
key. In February 1993, the newly elected Clinton–Gore
Administration adopted the idea (Levy, 1994). On April
16th, 1993, the White House announced the launch of
the voluntary Clipper initiative (White House, 1993). A
strong public reaction across the political spectrum fol-
lowed. Most computer experts, technology companies
and a social movement of digital natives opposed it (Rid,
2016, pp. 333–337). A series of hearings were held to
evaluate the technology. In early 1994, the Clipper pro-
gram officially started, yet it never saw any widespread
adoption. According to the National Research Council,
only 10,000 to 15,000 Clipper-enabled phones have ever
been sold, mostly to the government (Dam & Lin, 1996,
p. 174). A CNN survey in 1994 found that roughly 80%
of Americans opposed the initiative (US Senate, 1994).
The death blow camewhen a cryptography expert discov-
ered a security flaw within Clipper’s algorithm, although
the NSA and its supporters claimed the systemwas supe-
rior and more secure than anything else on the market
(Brickel, Denning, Kent, Maher, & Tuchman, 1993). Dur-
ing themid-1990s, the proposal was silently dropped. Ac-
cording to General Michael Hayden, the NSA “lost” this
crypto-war: “We didn’t get the Clipper Chip, we didn’t
get the back door” (Hayden, 2016a).
An outcome of the Clipper debate was that the
US government relaxed its strict opposition to the
widespread use of encryption. Laws like the Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) were
adopted to prohibit the government from forcing compa-
nies to build government backdoors in their technology
(Crawford, 2016). Over time, the US government relaxed
its very strict export-regime that treated cryptographic
products as dual-use goods. By the end of the 1990s, a
widespread consensus (Kehl et al., 2015, p. 19) had been
reached that “the advantages of more widespread use
of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages” (Dam &
Lin, 1996, p. 6). Scientists made the convincing case that
key-escrow systems “enabling exceptional access to keys
would be inherently less secure, more expensive, and
muchmore complex than those without” (Abelson et al.,
2015, p. 7).
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The debate about governmental “exceptional access”
reemerged in the summer of 2014, after Apple had de-
cided to turn device encryption of its iPhones on by de-
fault. On October 10th, FBI Director James B. Comey
warned that encryption was hindering evidence retrieval
for law enforcement. Comey urged the government to
adopt a legislative fix and companies to find a solution
(Comey, 2014). In fall 2015, the Washington Post pub-
lished internal communication from within the intelli-
gence community complaining about a hostile legislative
environment on the encryption matter “that could turn
in the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event where
strong encryption can be shown to have hindered law
enforcement” (Nakashima & Peterson, 2015). This was
a reference to President Obama who had indicated that
his government would not pursue legislation on the mat-
ter. The debate resurfaced on February 16th, 2016, when
an US Magistrate ruled—ex parte—that Apple must pro-
vide “reasonable technical assistance” to FBI investiga-
tors to unlock an iPhone 5C that belonged to the San
Bernardino shooter of December 2015 (Volz & Menn,
2016). The judge issued the warrant based on the All
Writs Act (AWA) from 1789, which becomes active only
if there is no other governing law, thus bypassing CALEA
(Tangri, Lemley, Feldman, & Landers, 2016). Apple in-
deed helped the FBI with this iPhone, but mistakes were
made andnormal unlocking procedures did notwork. Ap-
ple CEO Tim Cook, the main protagonist of the counter-
discourse, contested that the court order was “unreason-
ably burdensome” (Cook, 2016a). Because of the ongo-
ing election campaign, multiple high profile politicians,
intelligence professionals, media and tech companies be-
gan to publicly take side with or against Apple. Accord-
ing to a Pew survey, the public sided with the FBI ini-
tially, with around 51% arguing that Apple should help
the FBI. However, later polls with diverse methodologies
showed that the public sided with Apple (Elmer-Dewitt,
2016). The fierce discourse about encryption lasted un-
til March, when a Brooklyn court ruled in Apple’s favor
that AWA did not govern the unlocking of an iPhone in
a similar case (Lichtblau & Goldstein, 2016). The whole
debate suddenly disappeared in March, when it became
public that a third party could unlock the iPhone without
Apple’s help (Benner & Apuzzo, 2016). Two weeks later
it was revealed that the phone did not include any valu-
able information (McGoogan, 2016) and the Department
of Justice issued a filing that it would no longer need Ap-
ple’s assistance (Novet, 2016).
3. Methodology
The paper analyses the Clipper discourse between 1993–
1994 and the Apple/FBI case between 2014 and 2016,
with a focus on thepeak of the debate in February/March
2016. Using the snowball technique, a literature corpus
(Apple/FBI N = 42, Clipper N = 22) was assembled that
contains official statements, newspaper or internet cov-
erage, congressional hearings and some scientific liter-
ature of the respective debates. Documents repeatedly
mentioned in the corpus were analyzed more deeply us-
ing content analysis techniques (Mayring, 2000). The first
stepwas to identify the different discursive positions (op-
ponents, proponents andmiddle ground). Then the argu-
ments of the respective positionswere inductively identi-
fied and coded throughout the corpus in an iterative fash-
ion (Keller, 2007). Some codeswere deduced from the se-
curitization framework, namely threats, threatened ref-
erent objects and extraordinary measures that are de-
manded to remedy the threat and that go beyond estab-
lished social norms and procedures (Buzan et al., 1997,
pp. 23–24). Another aim was to find out which charac-
teristics, whether negative or positive, were being at-
tributed to encryption. Finally, the frequencies of individ-
ual codes were counted and collected in a table to pro-
vide some (limited) quantitative insights and to assess
what themost dominant arguments were in each debate.
Of course, these findings are not generalizable and serve
more as an ideal type (Weber, 1973) to gauge the gen-
eral content of other potential cryptography discourses
in the future.	
During the Clipper discourse in 1993, only 27% of
Americans owned a computer and 2% used the Inter-
net (World Bank, 2016). The Apple/FBI discourse on the
other hand happened at a time when 87% of Ameri-
cans used the Internet (World Bank, 2016), 73% had
a computer and 68% a smartphone (Anderson, 2015).
In contrast to 1993, cyber security issues like hacking,
data theft and state-sponsored cyber attacks were ubiq-
uitous in 2016, with encryption being one line of de-
fense against these issues. This means that in 2016, po-
tentially more customers were affected by the encryp-
tion debate. Additionally, the Apple/FBI case stands in
the context of the Snowden leaks of 2013 which un-
covered the extensive Internet surveillance capacities of
the NSA and its targeted operations against encryption
systems. NSA programs like Bullrun allegedly implanted
software backdoors in HTTPS encryption used for secure
web-browsing and also utilized hardware backdoors for
exceptional access to Internet routers (Ball, Borger, &
Greenwald, 2013). Other Snowden leaks indicate intense
NSA efforts to gain access to encrypted Virtual Private
Network connections, often used by large corporations
to offer secure access to files from afar (Goodin, 2015),
or even the Onion Router or TOR network, that utilizes
multiple layers of encryption and thus is highly resistant
to eavesdropping (Sayer, 2014). Thus, the Snowden leaks
increased public awareness of data security, encryption
and concerns about government surveillance programs
(Rainie & Maniam, 2016).
4. Comparing Two Crypto-War Discourses
4.1. Similarities between Clipper and Apple vs. FBI
The discursive positions in the two discourses are some-
what similar. Law enforcement (FBI), intelligence actors
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(NSA) and politicians (predominantly, but not exclusively
conservatives) argue for governmental regulation of en-
cryption and providing exceptional access for legitimate
law enforcement inquiries. In both discourses, this group
produces a relatively homogenous set of arguments.
Technology companies, cryptography experts, scientists
and a mix of civil-libertarians and tech enthusiasts argue
for widespread, public use of encryption. This group is
more heterogeneous and uses a huge variety of argu-
ments. In both instances, there is a middle ground, rec-
ognizing the needs of both groups and arguing for a com-
promise (which is technologically difficult to achieve).
When comparing the two discourses, it becomes im-
mediately obvious that the law enforcement perspec-
tive is very similar in both cases. The general argu-
ment is that “encryption threatens to significantly cur-
tail, and in many instances, preclude, effective law en-
forcement” (Sessions, 1993), which resembles the NSA’s
warning from 1979. This is the main argument (uttered
27x) within the debate and a center-piece of the “go-
ing dark” metaphor. It is supported by and often com-
bined with a legalistic justification that with a court or-
der or a warrant, the government should have access
to encrypted communication (39x). This is the extraordi-
nary measure demanded. It is extraordinary in the sense,
that the government wants access to communication in-
tended for no-one else except the communicating par-
ties and demands from companies to change their tech-
nology to meet wiretapping needs, effectively influenc-
ing hard and software development (Lessig, 2006, p. 66).
In other words, the crypto-war discourse is about estab-
lishing/contesting the norm of government control over
cryptography vs. the right of every user to communicate
privately (Levy, 1994).
How are these extraordinary capabilities and pow-
ers legitimized? Proponents argue that “criminals” (27x)
and “terrorists” (31x) cannot be caught if they use en-
cryption. Interestingly, the Clipper discourses highlights
“drug-traffickers”, whereas the Apple/FBI discourse is
more about “terrorists” and “child molesters”. These
are framed by law enforcement as the main threats.
Closely connected to the argument is the frame that
“law enforcement must keep pace” (9x) with malign ac-
tors. It creates the impression that the highly trained
and equipped, multi-million dollar law enforcement ap-
paratus is falling behind. The referent objects that need
to be protected from these threats are mentioned in
statements like the following: “Successful conduct of
electronic surveillance is crucial to effective law enforce-
ment, to the preservation of the public safety, and to
the maintenance of the national security” (15x) (Ses-
sions, 1993). This clearly indicates a national-security per-
spective. Widespread encryption itself is presented as a
threat or at least as a problem to national security (7x).
The key description here is that encryption is presented
(10x) as a “dual-edge sword: encryption helps to protect
the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can
shield criminals and terrorists” (White House, 1993). The
dilemma is that in both cases, the government recog-
nizes the positive effects of encryption for privacy and
the protection of intellectual property (12x). Therefore,
the key metaphor is the demand for the rightful balance
between privacy and (national) security (11x). In sum,
the negative effects of encryption and threats to national
security outweigh the benefits. The argument can be
found in its entirety in the press release following the offi-
cial announcement of the Clipper initiative in 1994: “if en-
cryption technology is made freely available worldwide,
it would no doubt be used extensively by terrorists, drug
dealers, and other criminals to harm Americans both in
the US and abroad. For this reason, the Administration
will continue to restrict export of the most sophisticated
encryption devices, both to preserve our own foreign in-
telligence gathering capability and because of the con-
cerns of our allies who fear that strong encryption tech-
nology would inhibit their law enforcement capabilities”
(White House, 1994).
Whereas the government predominantly uses na-
tional security-related arguments, the counter-discourse
is more heterogeneous. There are three types of argu-
ment. Technical arguments state that government access
makes encryption systems less secure and are mostly
put forward by the technology and science community.
Economic arguments argue against government interfer-
ence in the market and the costs of the proposal. Finally,
there are civil liberty arguments that revolve around pri-
vacy and mistrust of the expansion of state power and
are uttered by libertarians. There are also several other
arguments that overlap or do not necessarily fall into ei-
ther group. Their common denominator is that the gov-
ernment wants to interfere with the products of private
companies (24x) in terms of hardware with Clipper and
software with Apple. The metaphor of choice is that the
governmentwants to create a “backdoor” (25x) in an oth-
erwise secure system. Libertarians see this as an expan-
sion of government authority, or with the words of Ap-
ple CEO Tim Cook as “government overreach” (20x) and
thus as a potential threat (Cook, 2016a). Business actors
are more afraid of the potential future effects of the gov-
ernment regulating encryption, whichmight result in the
widespread use of inferior technology (15x).
These diverse groups share a relatively similar
perspective on encryption. Cryptography is a privacy-
enhancing technology (19x) and seen in an exclusively
positive way (13x). This explains why any government in-
terference is seen as problematic. The referent objects
in this discourse are privacy and civil liberties in particu-
lar (24x) and, more implicitly, American identity and val-
ues, which are prominently present in the Apple/FBI dis-
course. The argument in both cases is that control of en-
cryption technology is a norm of authoritarian regimes
and police states and therefore inappropriate in democ-
racies (14x). The technological principles of encryption
must be understood to make sense of this frame. The
fewer parties have access to a system, themore secure it
gets. Ideally, public key encryption only has two parties,
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the sender and receiver. With key-escrow, a third party
(the government) is introduced, which creates security
risks. The threat in both cases is that the method for ex-
ceptional access could fall into the wrong hands (21x)
and thus could potentially bemisused. In the case of Clip-
per, the key-escrow database could be stolen, and with
the Apple/FBI case, the source code for bypassing iOS se-
curity could be hacked, for example by foreign states.
However, there is also a general critique against the
government mandating which encryption products to
use. In both discourses, technical experts point to the
fact that thosewithmalign interestwill find away around
government mandated encryption (17x). The key ques-
tion that comes up in congressional hearings is: Which
bad actor would use a technology that he/she knows the
government is using to listen in (12x)? Ultimately, law-
abiding citizens would be forced to use an inferior tech-
nology, while bad actors could use encryption without
US backdoors from the international market. This argu-
ment is particularly brought forward by critics in the Ap-
ple/FBI case (11x), but also existed in a slightly different
form in 1993. The reference to foreign crypto-products
or the “off-shoring” of cryptography, as former Director
of NSAMichael Hayden calls it, is a compelling argument
in both cases (Hayden, 2016b). It creates the overall risk
that cryptography evolves outside the US market where
the government has even less control. This would create
a competitive disadvantage for American tech firms. The
economic damage of regulating cryptography to Ameri-
can business is a key argument in the Clipper discourse
(21x), but not so much in the Apple/FBI case (1x).
The general argument put forward by critics in both
cases is that the government should look at the bigger
picture (33x), recognizing the general interest of the peo-
ple and corporations that need encryption, both for pri-
vacy reasons but also for business interests and data se-
curity. Cryptography is no longer a state monopoly but
a matter for citizens (5x) and therefore the government
should not prioritize the particular interests of the NSA
and FBI. In other words, the general positive effects out-
weigh the negative effects for a greater audience. This ul-
timately reflects the legal and discursive consensus that
was reached during the mid-1990s.
4.2. Differences
Clipper and the Apple vs. FBI cases differ in some as-
pects. The Clipper initiative is a government attempt at
standard-setting using a NSA-developed chip. It is also a
voluntary technology initiative and not a law per se. This
means that the government utilizes a range of arguments
to “sell” their product to the skeptical audience by argu-
ing Clipper is far superior to anything else on the mar-
ket (22x), that Clipper does not weaken, but enhances,
privacy (9x) and generally that Clipper strikes the right
balance between security and privacy (6x). These argu-
ments are particularly highlighted in White House brief-
ing documents from the FBI/NSA and indicate that the
Clinton–Gore Administration must have been aware of
a potential backlash (Sessions, 1993). Another indicator
for this anticipation is the fact that this initiative is not a
law, but described as a “voluntary” tech initiative (7x).
Critics contest these arguments. The tech community
argues that the NSA developed Clipper (7x) and its en-
cryption algorithm in secrecy (11x), which goes against
industry best practices of public code evaluation and the
law because the National Institute for Standards would
be legally in charge (9x). Others criticize the enormous
cost of several million dollars annually that it would
take just to maintain the key-escrow infrastructure and
the cost of the Clipper chip itself, which would increase
hardware prices (8x). Because of these technical facts,
the initiative is described as premature, rushed and not
thought through (9x). A CNN poll of the time indicates
that a majority of 80% is not convinced of the govern-
ment’s arguments (US Senate, 1994). The fact that al-
most all technology companies and experts are against
the Clipper initiative is an important point (17x). To un-
derstand this, one must consider the strong skepticism
vis a vis government interference in the market (12x).
This is different in the counter-terrorism and post-
Snowden context of 2016. The first theme of the Apple
vs. FBI discourse is that encryption and its potential weak-
ening is not about the singular San Bernardino case but
a general matter. Apple systematically argues that gov-
ernmentmandated exceptional access is a “threat tomil-
lions of customers worldwide” and not just in the US
(30x). For Apple, the debate is not about one particular
iPhone, but a general case that affects potentially every
phone today and in the future (40x). The FBI wants to in-
terfere with Apple’s hard/software design (24x) to man-
date the construction of a backdoor (25x). Apple calls
it the “software equivalent of cancer” (Cook, 2016b). If
the courts allowed this, it would create a dangerous le-
gal precedent (26x), which the FBI repeatedly denies (al-
though Comey testifies that the FBI has around 600 other
iPhones to be unlocked) (C-Span, 2016). Apple repeat-
edly argues that in the encryption debate we need to
look at the bigger picture, beyond law enforcement in-
terests (33x). The bigger picture includes the cyber se-
curity landscapes and new threats: from cyber attacks
(20x), data-theft (14x) and hackers (15x). Backdoors re-
semble weaker encryption which itself is represented as
a threat (19x). Backdoors would introduce vulnerabilities
to all iPhones, which would represent an enormous pub-
lic safety risk (16x) because iPhones are used in areas like
government agencies and critical infrastructures. These
areas would become vulnerable to hacking. Weak en-
cryption wouldmake the entire digital infrastructure less
secure (10x). Apple also fears a potential future spillover:
weakening encryption now will harm the US digital in-
frastructure in the future (9x), because exploits could be
stolen, and thus fall into thewrong hands (15x). The pow-
erful technical argument that there is no backdoor that
could be exploited just by the good guys is put forward
(11x). Moreover, other agencies might dig up cases to
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mandate companies to build in backdoors for more triv-
ial reasons than fighting terrorism, a phenomenon called
function creep (10x).
The second discursive feature is an identity or moral
narrative. Apple argues that the referent objects are not
justmillions of customers or privacy and civil liberties but
American identity in general (23). “This is not who we
are”, says Tim Cook (Cook, 2016b). If Western Democra-
cies follow authoritarian regimes in their control of pri-
vate communication (via government access), it would
create a soft-power precedent (10x). Dictatorshipswould
feel legitimized in their surveillance of citizens. Likewise,
the FBI uses moralizing statements like “It is about the
victims and justice. Fourteen people were slaughtered
and many more had their lives and bodies ruined….We
can’t look the survivors in the eye, or ourselves in themir-
ror, if we don’t follow this lead” (Comey, 2016b). How-
ever, most of the FBI’s argument is rather legalistic, fo-
cusing on the argument that there should be no “warrant-
proof” spaces (Comey, 2016a).
In sum, the FBI and Apple recognize each other’s
good intentions and need for cooperation to resolve
this problem. Both parties argue that there needs to
be a broad public discussion about this difficult issue
(22x). Policymakers in general favor strong encryption
with exceptional, warrant-based access while the tech
community replies that the mathematics either support
secure encryption without government backdoors or ex-
ceptional access with significantly less security. The com-
bination of both secure cryptography and governmen-
tal access represents wishful thinking or the search for
a magic pony solution (Abelson et al., 2015).
5. Discussion
Whereas the Clipper discourse is focused mostly on the
privacy/security dichotomy, the Apple/FBI case shows
that in times of cyber crime and hacking, this dichotomy
needs to be rethought. Traditionally, the two have been
framed as an antagonismor a zero-sumgame:more secu-
ritymeans less privacy/liberty. This is not necessarily true
anymore because encryption enhances both privacy and
security, both individually but also collectively or glob-
ally. In an interconnected world, a vulnerability in one
iPhone is a threat for every user, as the recent Pegasus
spyware, which affected all 1 billion active iOS devices,
shows. Encryption is crucial for the security of digital in-
frastructures (i.e. cyber security). The question we need
to address is “whose security are we talking about”? The
debate shows that there are two paradigms of security
at work: a national security perspective with traditional,
physical threats such as terrorism and a cyber security
perspective, which considers the vulnerabilities of soft-
ware and hardware in terms of hacking, cyber crime and
state-sponsored cyber war. Former NSADirectorMichael
Hayden belongs to the latter and argues that considering
the cyber threat, “America is simplymore securewith un-
breakable end-to-end encryption” (Hayden, 2016a).
The second element we need to discuss critically is
the “going dark” metaphor, which creates a false dual-
ism of light and shadow and thus another artificial zero-
sum game. The metaphor ignores the fact that there are
multiple sources of light. Wiretapping of conversations is
just one stream of data among an increasing number of
law enforcement tools like automated biometric recog-
nition, DNA sampling, geo-location tracking or contact-
chaining with social network analysis. Our “digital ex-
haust” as Michael Hayden calls it, the often unencrypted
metadata we generate using smartphones and online
services such as Facebook or Google, is in fact growing
(Hayden, 2016b). Never before has there been so much
private information about us in the open. The govern-
ment has access to most of these new sources of data.
The amount of data traversing global networks in 2016
makes the year 1993 appear like the dark ages of data
and law enforcement. Arguing that we are currently “in
the light” and the future will be dark is somewhat mis-
leading. Just because content data is increasingly more
encrypted and one channel of data collection might be
“going dark”, it does not mean that all other channels are
going dark as well. The opposite is probably true.
The “going dark” metaphor creates a false techno-
logical-deterministic assumption that widespread cryp-
tography will automatically lead to only one single out-
come: a future of uninterceptable information. This sce-
nario is unlikely. There is no such thing as unbreakable
encryption. It might get more complicated but it is un-
likely that it will ever be impossible to break. Even today,
strong cryptography is circumvented by exploiting other
weaknesses in the system, which probably is the reason
why the FBI got into the San Bernardino iPhone without
Apple’s help (Benner & Apuzzo, 2016). Even if encryp-
tion was unbreakable, it would not be guaranteed that it
would ever reach 100% user adoption. The technological
barriers for users are still high and market mechanisms
like ad-based, big-data business models stand in the way
of widespread adoption. Practical reasons prohibit the
adoption of encryption, which is the same reason why
we do not whisper all the time to avoid eavesdropping. It
is often too impractical and inconvenient. Even if every-
one used encryption, people often make mistakes with
the implementation which makes their systems vulnera-
ble to attack (Gasser et al., 2016, p. 3).
Determinism overstates the effects of technology
and ignores human response strategies. It is too easy to
blame technologies when old strategies fail. To blame
technology would be akin to the French blaming the in-
vention of the tank for their inferior defense strategy
against the German Blitzkrieg tactics in World War 2.
There are always two components: technology and hu-
man agency. If encryption is indeed a problem, then
law enforcement and intelligence agencies simply must
adapt and change their operating strategies (Landau,
2016). For example, if electronic surveillance of a drug
dealer is not feasible anymore because he/she uses en-
crypted phone calls, one way to resolve the problem
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would be to use human intelligence like surveillance per-
sonnel on the ground or even traditional acoustic surveil-
lance bugs implanted in a car or house. Particularly the
“Internet of Things (IoT)” with microphones in Smart
TVs and loudspeakers and the trend of cloud-computing
will offer new, unique capabilities that could be used
in the traditional warrant process (Gasser et al., 2016,
p. 10). At the same time, in the context of the grow-
ing vulnerabilities of a digitalized IoT infrastructure, safe
systems and strong encryption are imperative. The old
Clipper consensus that the widespread use of cryptog-
raphy is the greater good is still valid, even though it is
understandably harder to see in the current context of
global terrorism.
As threatening as terrorism may be, cyber attacks
fromnation-states, cyber crime and digital espionage are
growing rapidly and are costing millions of dollars annu-
ally. Richard C. Clarke, the senior counter-terrorism of-
ficial during the Bush administration argued: “my point
is encryption and privacy are larger issues than fight-
ing terrorism” (Clarke, 2016). The ongoing securitization
of cryptography in liberal democracies sets a normative
precedent. Directly after the Apple/FBI debate, countries
like Russia began to demand backdoors in cryptographic
messengers like WhatsApp and Telegram by law and re-
ferred to the practices of Western democracies for justi-
fication (Howell O’Neill, 2016). Currently, France, Great
Britain, Germany and others are pursuing similar legisla-
tion. Interestingly, the discourses in liberal and authori-
tarian countries rely on similar rhetorical figures, threat
descriptions and referent objects identified in this arti-
cle. To qualify this, further comparative research would
be required. Authoritarian regimes will probably use ex-
ceptional access not to prosecute terrorists, but the po-
litical opposition or human rights NGOs. Besides this nor-
mative argument there is also a technical one: the more
governments replicate this practice of actively punching
holes in cryptography without disclosing them publicly,
the less secure the worldwide IT-infrastructure gets.
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